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INTRODUCTION
In this paper, I place the United States’ adherence to citizenship-based
taxation in the context of the states’ tax systems. Forty-one states impose
general income taxes on the worldwide incomes of their respective re-
sidents.1 These state tax systems are important repositories of experience
that confirm the administrative benefits of citizenship-based taxation.
Domicile today plays an important role in state tax systems as a gap-filler
when more objective statutory residence laws fail to assign any state of
residence to the taxpayer. Citizenship is an administrable proxy for domi-
cile and serves a similar gap-filling role in the taxation of individuals
whose income and activities straddle national boundaries.
For income tax purposes, most states today define residence as either
domicile (the traditional definition) or as statutory residence, typically for-
mulated as an individual’s satisfaction of an objective test such as 183 days
spent in the state.2 In contrast to the relatively objective nature of statu-
* Morris and Annie Trachman Professor of Law, Benjamin N. Cardozo School of
Law, Yeshiva University.
1. WALTER HELLERSTEIN, KIRK J. STARK, JOHN A. SWAIN & JOAN M. YOUNGMAN,
STATE AND LOCAL TAXATION: CASES AND MATERIALS 373 (10th ed. 2014) [hereinafter
STATE AND LOCAL TAXATION].
2. Id. at 379-82.
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tory residence laws, the fact-intensive domicile inquiry focuses upon the
taxpayer’s intent to return to the taxing state and his permanent allegiance
to that state, rather than his immediate physical presence in the state.3 As
the domicile inquiry is factually complex, it is both manipulable by the
taxpayer and difficult for the tax collector to enforce. The contemporary
domicile standard is best understood as a gap-filler invoked by the states
when the more objective test of statutory residence fails to assign the tax-
payer to any state of residence.
The states’ difficulties enforcing domicile-based taxation highlight the
administrative benefits of citizenship-based taxation. As long as residence
is understood for tax purposes in terms of domicile, citizenship is an effi-
cient proxy for such domicile. The states’ experience defining residence
supports the United States’ citizenship-based approach to federal income
taxation. Under the Internal Revenue Code, citizenship serves as an ad-
ministrable proxy for domicile and fulfills the same gap-filling function
played by domicile under the states’ income taxes.
I. SOME PRELIMINARY OBSERVATIONS
As a preliminary matter, I would observe that the conventional narra-
tives used to denigrate citizenship-based taxation do not impress me. The
alleged uniqueness of the United States’ worldwide taxation of its citizens’
incomes does not embarrass me.4 The United States is also unusual in the
strength of its protections for religious liberty5 and free speech. I do not
apologize for that uniqueness either.
Moreover, when one looks at the cases in the English-speaking world,
U.S. law is not as unique as some suggest. When residence is defined, ex-
plicitly or implicitly, as domicile, the outcomes are typically similar to
those that citizenship-based taxation achieves in a more efficient manner.6
I am equally unimpressed by the alleged horror stories of U.S. citizens
renouncing their citizenships because of U.S. income tax burdens.7 In the
context of the millions of U.S. citizens living abroad, the 3,417 U.S. citizens
who renounced U.S. citizenship in 2014 is a relative handful of individuals
3. See infra notes 21-40 and accompanying text.
4. Cf. Jacqueline Bugnion, Concerns About the Taxation of Americans Resident
Abroad, 148 TAX NOTES 861, 862 (2015) (“The United States is the odd man out with this
attitude.”); Teri Sprackland, London Mayor to Relinquish U.S. Citizenship, 146 TAX NOTES
963 (2015) (“Only the United States, apart from Eritrea, taxes all its citizens . . . .”).
5. See, e.g., EEOC v. Abercrombie & Fitch Stores, 135 S. Ct. 2028 (2015) (protecting
the right of a practicing Muslim to wear a headscarf in the prospective workplace); Reed v.
Town of Gilbert, 135 S. Ct. 2218 (2015) (holding that tighter restrictions on sign advertising
church are content-based regulations which violate the First Amendment); see also JOHN T.
NOONAN, JR., THE LUSTRE OF OUR COUNTRY: THE AMERICAN EXPERIENCE OF RELIGIOUS
FREEDOM 9 (1998) (“The American experience has lighted up the skies.”).
6. Edward A. Zelinsky, Citizenship and Worldwide Taxation: Citizenship As an Ad-
ministrable Proxy for Domicile, 96 IOWA L. REV. 1291-93 (2011) [hereinafter Zelinsky, Citi-
zenship and Worldwide Taxation].
7. See, e.g., Bugnion, supra note 4, at 862.
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who elected to surrender U.S. citizenship.8 I also confess that anecdotes
about Boris Johnson leave me unimpressed.9
The Civil War origins of citizenship-based taxation,10 while of historic
interest, similarly tell us nothing about the value vel non of citizenship-
based taxation today. Legal rules often persist because they serve pur-
poses originally unintended by their authors.11 Citizenship-based taxation
is one of these.
Finally, the difficulty of collecting income tax from many U.S. citizens
who live abroad is not, by itself, reason to abandon the effort to tax them.
It is also difficult to collect income tax from the domestic cash economy,
including illegal activity. That difficulty, however, does not lead us to
abandon the effort to reach this hard-to-tax cash income.
II. THE PERSISTENCE OF RESIDENCE-BASED INCOME TAXATION
Instead of these premises, I start from the proposition that residence-
based income taxation is and will continue to be a permanent part of inter-
national and U.S. domestic tax systems. Some argue that we should move
to source-based taxes for active business income and for easily allocable
income such as real estate rents.12 Justice Ginsburg, in her recent dissent
in Wynne,13 argues that the U.S. Supreme Court is forcing the states to-
ward such source-based income taxation by requiring, as a constitutional
matter, that states of residence offer credits to their respective residents
for income taxes paid to the states of source.
Yet, even if source-based taxation predominates, we will continue to
need residence-based taxation for passive income such as interest, divi-
dends, royalties, capital gains from stocks and bonds, and other forms of
income derived from these kinds of mobile intangible investments.
8. Sprackland, supra note 4, at 963. Moreover, “there were only 483 individuals who
gave up their U.S. citizenship during the quarter ending June 30, 2015.” Andrew Velarde,
Theories for Expatriation Numbers Abound, but Answers Elusive, TAX NOTES TODAY 174-1
(2015).
9. See Robert Goulder, Should London Mayor Boris Johnson Pay U.S. Taxes?,
FORBES (Jan. 26, 2015), www.forbes.com/sites/taxanalysts/2015/01/26/should-london-mayor-
boris-johnson-pay-u-s-taxes/.
10. See generally Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, The Case Against Taxing Citizens 3 ) (Univ. of
Mich. Law Sch. Law & Economics Working Paper No. 12, 2010) (“Citizenship-based taxation
of Americans living overseas began during the Civil War.”).
11. ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE NEW AGE OF POLITICAL REFORM: THE ELECTORAL
COLLEGE, THE CONVENTION AND THE PARTY SYSTEM 3-4 (1968) (“We have, of course,
many institutions and arrangements that, as they function, no longer conform to the original
scheme, and we have bent most of them quite effectively to the purposes of our present
society. . .  .”).
12. See, e.g., Fadi Shaheen, International Tax Neutrality: Reconsiderations, 27 VA. TAX
REV. 203, 205 (2007) (proposing “source-based taxation”).
13. Comptroller of the Treasury of Maryland v. Wynne, 135 S. Ct. 1787, 1813 (2015)
(Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
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The maxim mobilia sequuntur personam,14 while typically deployed
talismanically, nevertheless corresponds in the income tax context to an
important truth: even if source-based taxation becomes dominant, we will
still need residence-based taxation for interest, dividends, royalties, capital
gains from stocks and bonds, and other similar kinds of passive income
generated by intangible investments. If these forms of highly mobile, in-
tangible income were to be taxed only on the basis of source, it would be
easy for individuals to avoid taxation by moving their intangible properties
to low- and no-tax jurisdictions. Without residence-based taxation of in-
tangible incomes, an individual could transfer his stocks, bonds, bank ac-
counts, patents and other intellectual property to a custodian in a low- or
no-tax jurisdiction and thereby avoid any significant tax on the income
generated by these forms of highly-mobile, intangible property.15 To avoid
this scenario, tax systems must allocate investment income such as divi-
dends, interest, and royalties to the jurisdiction in which the investor
resides.
III. DEFINING RESIDENCE: DOMICILE V. STATUTORY RESIDENCE
Once it is granted that residence-based income taxation will persist in
one form or another, we must define residence for tax purposes. Tradition-
ally, residence meant domicile, an individual’s permanent home looking at
all of the facts and circumstances reflecting an intention to return. Most
U.S. states that impose an income tax declare that those domiciled in the
state are residents for tax purposes, taxable by the state of residence on
their worldwide incomes.16
Over time, most U.S. states also concluded that, for tax systems, domi-
cile is too subjective to be the sole criterion for residence for income tax
purposes. The result has been the emergence of what in the domestic U.S.
context have come to be called “statutory residence” laws.17
Under this more mechanical approach to residence, the fact-intensive
domiciliary test for residence is paralleled statutorily by simultaneously
defining residence for income tax purposes using limited, relatively objec-
tive criteria. The objective criteria for statutory residence are typically the
number of days spent in the state, whether an individual has a home in the
14. Indiana Dep’t of State Revenue v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 639 N.E.2d 264, 268
(1994) (“The long-established rule for taxing tangible property, mobilia sequuntur personam,
held that such property followed the person of the owner. Under this rule, the owner’s place
of domicile had the sole authority to tax his personal property.”).
15. See generally Edward A. Zelinsky, Apportioning State Personal Income Taxes to
Eliminate the Double Taxation of Dual Residents: Thoughts Provoked by the Proposed Min-
nesota Snowbird Tax, 15 FLA. TAX REV. 533, 540-41 (2014) [hereinafter Zelinsky, Apportion-
ing State Personal Income Taxes].
16. For an example, consider Conn. Gen. Stat. §§ 12-701(a)(1) (defining a resident as
an individual “domiciled in” Connecticut or an individual who “maintains a permanent place
of abode in” Connecticut and is present in Connecticut “more than one hundred eighty-three
days of the taxable year”) and §§ 12-701(a)(19) and 701(a)(20) (defining a Connecticut resi-
dent’s “Connecticut adjusted gross income”).
17. Zelinsky, Apportioning State Personal Income Taxes, supra note 15, at 543-45.
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state, or a combination of such limited and objective factors.18 To date, no
state has been willing to exclusively rely upon the more mechanical rules
of statutory residence to the exclusion of the facts-and-circumstances test
of domicile.
Michigan’s income tax statute is illustrative. For Michigan income tax
purposes, the term “resident” means an individual domiciled in the state:
“Domicile” means a place where a person has his true, fixed and
permanent home and principal establishment to which, whenever
absent therefrom he intends to return, and domicile continues un-
til another permanent establishment is established. . . . If an indi-
vidual lives in this state at least 183 days during the tax year . . . he
shall be deemed a resident individual domiciled in this state.19
Michigan’s statute reflects all of the themes of contemporary state in-
come tax law with respect to defining residence: An individual domiciled
in Michigan is a resident for income tax purposes. Domicile is an individ-
ual’s permanent home. Domicile entails the fact-based determination
whether an individual “intends to return” to Michigan, regardless of his
current presence vel non in the Wolverine State. Independently of her
domicile status, an individual is objectively “deemed a resident” for tax
purposes in any year she lives in Michigan for “at least 183 days.”20
The reasons for the dual definition of state residency for income tax
purposes – domicile or statutory residence – start with revenue: if there
are two chances to tax an individual as a resident, the tax collector is more
likely to succeed with one of these approaches. On a more principled ba-
sis, both the traditional concept of domicile and more objective statutory
residence laws have their respective strengths and limitations and, thus,
complement each other.
IV. DOMICILE: MANIPULABLE, DIFFICULT TO ENFORCE
The sprawling, fact-based nature of the concept of domicile makes it
manipulable by the taxpayer and difficult to enforce by the tax collector.
Under a system of self-assessment, the subjective manipulability of the test
of domicile leads some – likely many – individuals to play with the tax
collector a game of “catch me if you can.” There is a vast literature, indeed
a thriving industry, advising clients how to situate their respective domi-
ciles in low-tax states like Florida and Nevada.21 The facts-and-circum-
18. See supra note 16 and accompanying text; see also STATE AND LOCAL TAXATION,
supra note 1, at 379-82.
19. MICH. COMP. LAWS § 206.18(1)(a) (1967).
20. MICH. COMP. LAWS § 206.18(1)(a) (1967).
21. See, e.g., Andrew Berger, Florida Domicile: Steps to Establishing It and Pitfalls to
Beware, FLA. CONDO & HOA LAW BLOG (Aug. 31, 2012), http://www.floridacondohoalaw-
blog.com/2012/08/articles/estate-tax/florida-domicile-steps-to-establishing-it-and-pitfalls-to-
beware/; Layne T. Rushforth, Establishing Legal Domicile in Nevada, THE RUSHFORTH FIRM
(May 21, 2014), http://rushforth.net/pdf/domicile.pdf.
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stances quality of the domicile inquiry makes that inquiry intrinsically
unwieldy and difficult for the tax collector to enforce.
Consider, for example, the decision of Maryland’s Court of Special
Appeals in McDermond v. Comptroller of the Treasury.22 Mr.
McDermond resided in Maryland and worked as an executive for Under
Armour. Mr. McDermond moved to the Netherlands in 2006 to supervise
Under Armour’s European operations. When he relocated to the Nether-
lands, Mr. McDermond did not sell his Baltimore home but instead leased
it to his brother. When Mr. McDermond returned to Baltimore for busi-
ness trips in 2006 and 2007, he stayed “in hotels or temporary housing.”23
“In preparation for his move to the Netherlands, McDermond sold his car,
closed his Maryland bank accounts, and moved some of his furniture and
many of his personal possessions to the Netherlands.”24 He acquired a
Dutch driver’s license but abandoned his effort to speak to Dutch.
On his trips back to Baltimore, Mr. McDermond attended his church
in Baltimore. He continued to contribute to that church while he lived in
the Netherlands. While living in the Netherlands, Mr. McDermond told
the Baltimore jury commissioner that he was a nonresident living abroad.
This resulted in the government (not Mr. McDermond himself) cancelling
his status as a Maryland voter. However, while employed by Under Ar-
mour in the Netherlands, Mr. McDermond renewed his Maryland driver’s
license. The license renewal form included a certification under penalties
of perjury that he was a Maryland resident.
In an apparent effort to bolster Mr. McDermond’s claim to be a non-
resident of Maryland, Under Armour amended the written terms of his
employment. Originally, Mr. McDermond and Under Armour contem-
plated a two-year assignment in Europe. Subsequently, Under Armour
stated that it expected Mr. McDermond to remain abroad indefinitely. For
the tax year in question (2007), Mr. McDermond spent ninety-nine days in
the United States. Of these, forty were working days in Baltimore while
the remaining days in the United States were nonworking days. In 2008,
Mr. McDermond’s European assignment for Under Armour ended and he
returned to Maryland to continue to work for Under Armour.25
On these facts, Maryland’s Comptroller, Maryland’s Tax Court, and
the Circuit Court for Baltimore City concluded that Mr. McDermond was
domiciled in Maryland in 2007 and, as a Maryland resident, owed Mary-
land taxes for that year on his worldwide income.26 Maryland’s Court of
Special Appeals agreed, observing that an individual’s domicile is “his
true, fixed, permanent home, habitation and principal establishment, with-
22. McDermond v. Comptroller of the Treasury, No. 1299, 2015 Md. App. LEXIS 412
(Md. Ct. Spec. App. July 9, 2015).
23. Id., at *3.
24. Id.
25. Id., at *8.
26. Id., at *9-*10.
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out any present intention of removing therefrom, and to which place he
has, whenever he is absent, the intention of returning.”27
The appeals court concurred with the Maryland Tax Court that, not-
withstanding the amendment of the nominal term of Mr. McDermond’s
employment, Under Armour and Mr. McDermond anticipated that he
would be abroad in the Netherlands for only two years.28 In fact, that is
what happened as Mr. McDermond stayed and worked in the Netherlands
for twenty-two months. Four other factors, according to the appeals court,
supported the finding that Mr. McDermond was domiciled in Baltimore in
2007: namely, his retention of a Maryland driver’s license, his “failure to
make any social, civil, or other connections in the Netherlands,” his at-
tendance at his Baltimore church when he returned to the United States,
and his “failure to affirmatively cancel his Maryland voter registration.”29
What is striking about the McDermond case is how typical it is. In-
deed, the appeals court thought McDermond so unexceptional that the
court consigned its McDermond decision to the judicial purgatory of “un-
reported” opinions, not citable as precedent. The state courts churn out
fact-based domicile tax decisions like McDermond on a regular basis.30
These cases reflect the sprawling, fact-based nature of the domicile in-
quiry; the continuing efforts of taxpayers to manipulate that facts-and-cir-
cumstances inquiry to avoid paying state income taxes on the basis of
domiciliary residence; and the states’ difficulties enforcing the subjective
standard of domicile.
The uncertainties of the fact-and-circumstances test of domicile are
confirmed by the efforts of the states to codify that test. Those codification
efforts result in laundry lists of factors that provide no more certainty
about the domicile inquiry than does the case law.
Kansas’s regulations, for example,31 identify a variety of facts to be
considered in determining an individual’s domicile. These facts include
where the individual, her spouse, or her children attend school,32 and
where they “regularly participate in sporting events, group activities, or
public performances.”33 However, the Kansas regulations caution that
none of these enumerated facts is determinative34 and that “any other
fact” may be “relevant to the determination” of a person’s domicile.35
27. Id., at *12 (quoting Shenton v. Abbott, 178 Md. 526, 530, 15 A.2d 906 (1940)).
28. Id., at *17-*18.
29. Id., at *18-*19.
30. See, e.g., Cause v. Dep’t of Revenue, 2015 Or. Tax LEXIS 148 (Or. T.C. Nov. 19,
2015); George v. Dir. of Revenue, ST. TAX TODAY, Nov. 23, 2015 (Del. Tax App. Bd. Nov.
17, 2015); Morgan L. Holcomb & John Mule, Persistence of Residence, ST. TAX TODAY, Aug.
30, 2012 (discussing residence determinations in state courts); Zelinsky, Apportioning State
Personal Income Taxes, supra note 15, at 542 n.31 (collecting domicile tax cases).
31. KAN. ADMIN. REGS. § 92-12-4a(b)(7) (2009).
32. KAN. ADMIN. REGS. § 92-12-4a(b)(7)(P) (2009).
33. KAN. ADMIN. REGS. § 92-12-4a(b)(7)(R) (2009).
34. KAN. ADMIN. REGS. § 92-12-4a(b)(7) (2009).
35. KAN. ADMIN. REGS. § 92-12-4a(b)(7)(S) (2009).
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Maine similarly declares that “no single factor” determines a person’s
domicile.36 Among the myriad facts which are potentially relevant are the
location of an individual’s “fraternal, social or athletic memberships” as
well as “the location of a church or other house of worship of which [an
individual is] a member.”37 Also potentially relevant to Maine’s domicile
inquiry is where an individual keeps her pets.38
In the same vein, the Cooperative Agreement on Determination of
Domicile promulgated by the North Eastern States Tax Officials Associa-
tion39 identifies as relevant to the determination of an individual’s domi-
cile such vague factors as the individual’s “overall living pattern or life
style.” These unwieldy documents do not reflect a failure of draftsman-
ship. Rather, they confirm the inherently sprawling nature of the fact-
based domicile inquiry. Determining an individual’s “true, fixed and per-
manent home”40 is an inherently messy enterprise. Individuals can accord-
ingly manipulate the domicile standard while tax collectors find that
subjective standard difficult to enforce.
V. THE STATES’ MORE OBJECTIVE STATUTORY RESIDENCE LAWS
In contrast to the unwieldy, facts-and-circumstances quality of the law
of domicile, the states’ more objective statutory residence laws are both
easier for the taxpayer to avoid and for the state to enforce. A law like
Michigan’s leads to a relatively straightforward inquiry: Was the taxpayer
in the state on 183 days during the taxable year? If so, she is deemed a
resident for income tax purposes, subject to state taxation on her world-
wide income.41 If not, the tax collector can still assert that the taxpayer is
domiciled in-state and, therefore, taxed as a resident on that alternative
basis.
The dual definition of state residence resembles those states’ traffic
laws that include both an objective speed limit (e.g., 65 miles per hour) and
a more subjective prohibition on “unsafe” driving. At 70 miles per hour,
the driver violates the objective limit. At 60 miles per hour, the driver
complies with it. However, even at 60 miles per hour, the driver may be
driving unsafely if, for example, the weather and visibility are poor. This,
however, is a more subjective, fact-dependent inquiry than looking at the
car’s speed.
Similarly, a statutory residence test like Michigan’s requires the rela-
tively focused, mechanical inquiry whether the taxpayer is in-state for at
least 183 days of the year. The taxpayer who does not trigger that test may
36. Maine Revenue Service Provides Guidelines on Residency Status for Income Tax
Purposes, ST. TAX TODAY, Dec. 28, 2015.
37. Id.
38. Id.
39. Northeastern States Tax Officials Association Releases Cooperative Tax Agreement,
ST. TAX TODAY, Nov. 4, 1996.
40. MICH. COMP. LAWS § 206.18(1)(a) (1967).
41. MICH. COMP. LAWS § 206.18(1)(a) (1967).
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still be taxed as a resident if he is deemed to be domiciled in Michigan. As
the legion of cases like McDermond establish, domicile is a factually messy
inquiry into the taxpayer’s intent to return, considering all of the facts and
circumstances.
VI. THE PERSISTENCE OF DOMICILE
Given the rise of statutory residence rules, the manipulability of the
traditional standard of domicile, and the states’ difficulties enforcing that
subjective, fact-based standard, why do the states continue to define resi-
dence as domicile for income tax purposes?
There is undoubtedly an element of inertia in the states’ continued use
of the concept of domicile to define residence for income tax purposes.
Domicile is the traditional way of defining residence. As the states devel-
oped their statutory residence laws, they initially adopted those laws to
supplement, rather than replace, the fact-based definition of residence as
domicile.42 The historic definition of residence as domicile was already on
the books and was deeply embedded in practice and case law.43 Moreover,
the dual definition of residence for state income tax purposes—domicile
or statutory residence—bolsters states’ revenues by giving a state two
chances to classify any individual as a resident, subject to state taxation on
his worldwide income.
Benefits-based justifications can also be advanced for defining resi-
dence as domicile, but these justifications are not persuasive.44 The es-
sence of domiciliary status is an individual’s long-term intent, as reflected
in all of the facts and circumstances, to return to the jurisdiction in which
she is domiciled. An individual currently living elsewhere, the argument
might run, benefits presently from the public services which maintain the
jurisdiction of domicile for her eventual return.45
The problem with this benefits-based argument is that the domiciliary
resident who lives outside her state of domicile is, on a day-to-day basis,
receiving her most salient public services in the state where she currently
lives, not the state of domicile to which she ultimately intends to return. In
comparison with the benefits received from the state in which she pres-
ently lives, the public services derived from her state of domicile are de-
ferred and attenuated. These future benefits are not a convincing basis for
justifying income taxation today by the state of domicile, in comparison
with income taxation by the state providing her benefits currently.
An alternative characterization is that a domiciliary resident currently
living elsewhere should pay tax to her state of domicile as a form of pre-
payment for the benefits she will receive when she eventually returns
there.46 However, when she returns, she will then pay resident income tax
42. See Tamagni v. Tax Appeals Tribunal, 695 N.E.2d 1125, 1128 (N.Y. 1998).
43. Id.
44. Zelinsky, Citizenship and Worldwide Taxation, supra note 6, at 1314-23.
45. Id. at 1315-16.
46. Id.
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for the benefits she is then receiving. There is no reason the domiciliary
resident living in another state should pay tax twice, once today as a pre-
payment for future benefits and once again in the future for benefits re-
ceived when she actually returns to the state of domicile.
When an individual moves to a new state, she is not required to pay an
entrance fee to compensate the state for its prior operations during the
years before the new resident relocated there. There is no reason that a
domiciliary resident of this state should be required to pay the equivalent
of that entrance fee in the form of resident-based income taxes during the
years she lives elsewhere.
Another potential argument for defining residence as domicile for in-
come tax purposes is that domicile represents a foundational relationship
with the state to which the individual will eventually return.47 According
to this argument, Mr. McDermond was a member of the Maryland polity
while he lived in the Netherlands and, hence, should be taxed as a member
of that polity.
This a plausible argument in terms of the nation-state: i.e., Mr.
McDermond’s prime political membership remained in the United States
while he lived abroad. However, the relationships of U.S. citizens to their
respective states are today not robust. Few U.S. citizens today believe that
it is psychologically or politically significant when they move from State A
to State B or attach great meaning to a political affiliation with one state
as opposed to another.48
VII. DOMICILE AS GAP-FILLER
The best argument today for defining residence for income tax pur-
poses as domicile is that domicile is a default setting, a gap-filler to make
sure that everyone is a taxpaying resident somewhere. Statutory residence
laws, with their relatively bright lines, are easier for the government to
enforce, but also easier for some (particularly affluent) taxpayers to avoid.
The traditional theory is that everyone has a domicile and, thus, must be a
taxpaying resident somewhere. Domicile today serves as a gap-filler when
more mechanical statutory residence rules are under-inclusive.
Suppose, for example, that a tax-conscious retiree spends part of the
year at his home in Michigan and part of the year at his house in New
Mexico. New Mexico’s objective test of statutory residence is 185 in-state
days during the year.49 Suppose that this retiree is careful to live for 180
days in each of these two states, spending the remaining five days of the
year elsewhere. Under these circumstances, neither state can assert statu-
tory residence against this individual since he only lives in either state for
180 days, just short of the mechanical criteria for statutory residence. If
statutory residence were the only basis for asserting resident status for in-
come tax purposes, this retiree would owe no residence-based state in-
47. Zelinsky, Apportioning State Personal Income Taxes, supra note 15, at 559-60.
48. Id.
49. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 7-2-2S (2014).
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come taxes anywhere, since he would not be a resident of either Michigan
or New Mexico.
Specifically, this individual would owe no state taxes on his dividends,
interest, royalties, and capital gains from stocks and bonds since such pas-
sive investment income generated by intangible assets is taxed by the state
of residence50—and this individual would have no state of residence if res-
idence were only defined in objective statutory terms. Moreover, under
federal law, no state could tax this individual’s pension, 401(k), or individ-
ual retirement account (IRA) distributions since only the state of resi-
dence can tax retirement distributions51 and this individual carefully
conducts his affairs to avoid classification as a statutory resident in the two
states in which he owns homes.
In this example, the concept of domicile fills the gap left by statutory
residence laws. For income tax purposes, domicile assigns a state of resi-
dence to this retiree on the basis of facts-and-circumstances indicating a
permanent intention to return.
There is, in this setting, the danger that the concept of domicile, in
practice, will overtax this individual if both New Mexico and Michigan
claim to be his state of domicile and both tax his worldwide income on the
basis of residence.52 We should, in such cases of dual residence, develop
rules requiring the apportionment of the dual resident’s income between
his two states of residence.
However, for present purposes, the critical point is that the U.S. states
persist in using domicile as an alternative test of residence for income tax
purposes. While the continuing use of domicile may in part be attributable
to inertia, tradition, and revenue considerations, domicile also plays a gap-
filling role when taxpayers keep their in-state presence below the mechan-
ical threshold triggering statutory residence.
Domicile as gap-filler is a diminution of domicile’s historically domi-
nant role in defining residence. Before the rise of statutory residence rules,
domicile was the traditional definition of residence.53 Statutory residence
laws were originally adopted to supplement, rather than subordinate,
domicile as the criterion for residence for income tax purposes.54 Charac-
terizing domicile as filling the gaps left by objective statutory residence
rules demotes domicile to the status of junior partner, in practice secon-
dary to the statutory residence laws originally envisioned to support the
traditional concept of domicile.
However, despite the difficulties of enforcing the test of domicile, the
gap-filling function of that test has proved compelling. Consequently, few
states have eschewed domicile as an alternative, subjective basis for assert-
50. Zelinsky, Apportioning State Personal Income Taxes, supra note 15, at 540-41.
51. 4 U.S.C. § 114 (2015).
52. Zelinsky, Apportioning State Personal Income Taxes, supra note 15, at 542-43.
53. Tamagni v. Tax Appeals Tribunal, 695 N.E.2d 1125, 1128 (N.Y. 1998) (discussing
the history of New York’s statutory residence law).
54. Id.
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ing residence for income tax purposes – despite the manipulability and
unwieldy nature of the subjective domicile inquiry.
VIII. CITIZENSHIP AS A GAP-FILLING PROXY FOR DOMICILE
In sum, most states have retained the sprawling, fact-based concept of
domicile for state income tax purposes rather than making objective statu-
tory residence laws the exclusive tests of residence. This suggests that,
under a residence-based income tax system, the federal government, look-
ing at the states’ experience, would similarly decline to define residence in
purely mechanical terms and would instead insist on a gap-filling defini-
tion of residence, like domicile, to apply when objective definitions of resi-
dence prove under-inclusive.
In fact, the federal government takes this dual definition approach
when it identifies when an alien is a U.S. resident for tax purposes and,
thus, taxed by the United States on his worldwide income. Emulating the
states, the Internal Revenue Code promulgates an objective test of an
alien’s physical presence in the United States. This mechanical test of an
alien’s substantial physical presence is analogous to the states’ statutory
residence laws. Also emulating the states, the Code supplements this test
of physical presence with the domicile-like criterion of “permanent resi-
dence.”55 An alien who triggers either of these rules is taxed by the United
States as a resident on his worldwide income.
Section 7701(b)(1)(A)(ii) of the Internal Revenue Code56 is a federal
analogue to the states’ statutory residence laws. Section 7701(b)(1)(A)(ii)
eschews any inquiry into intent, facts, or circumstances and instead estab-
lishes an objective test of an alien’s residence for income tax purposes, a
test denoted in the Code as “substantial presence.” The federal test of
“substantial presence” is not precisely like state statutory residence laws
because an alien’s “substantial presence” in the United States is based on
her physical presence in the United States measured over a three-year pe-
riod, not a single year.57 Nevertheless, § 7701(b)(1)(A)(ii) resembles state
statutory residence laws as a relatively focused, objective effort to assess
noncitizens’ residence in the United States on the basis of a mechanical
test of physical presence rather than more subjective, facts-and-circum-
stances inquiries about an individual’s intent and ultimate location.
Alternatively, if a noncitizen flunks the objective test of substantial
presence but holds “permanent resident” status under U.S. immigration
law, he is subject to taxation on his worldwide income as a U.S. resident.
This statutory pattern for aliens resembles the states’ dual income tax defi-
nitions of residence. Just as the states take two bites of the residence ap-
ple, the Code has two alternative tests for taxing an alien on his worldwide
income. If an alien triggers either of these tests, he is deemed to be a U.S.
resident, taxed by the United States on his worldwide income.
55. I.R.C. § 7701(b)(1)(A)(i) (2015).
56. I.R.C. §§ 7701(b)(1)(A)(ii)–(b)(3) (2015).
57. I.R.C. § 7701(b)(3)(A) (2015).
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However, there is an important difference between the Code and the
states’ tax systems: rather than asking whether the alien taxpayer is domi-
ciled in the United States, § 7701(b)(1)(A)(i)58 uses an objective proxy for
domicile, namely, whether the alien holds a “green card.” Thus, under the
Code, permanent residence status under federal immigration law serves a
gap-filling function analogous to domicile in the state law context. If an
alien’s physical presence in the United States falls below the threshold
identified by the substantial presence test, the alien’s green card neverthe-
less subjects him to U.S. taxation on his worldwide income.59
For income tax purposes, an alien’s green card serves as an adminis-
trable proxy for his U.S. domicile. An individual who is a permanent U.S.
resident for immigration law purposes is implicitly deemed domiciled in
the United States for federal income tax purposes even if, in the short-run,
his physical presence in the United States is not “substantial” under the
objective test of § 7701(b)(1)(A)(ii). Immigration status is an objective,
domicile-like gap-filler, taxing as a U.S. resident an alien who falls short of
the mechanical substantial presence test.
Against this background, let us now play a thought game: Suppose
that Congress, heeding the critics of citizenship-based taxation, were to
consider expanding § 7701(b)(1)(A)(ii) to make its objective “substantial
presence” test applicable not just to aliens but to citizens as well. Looking
at the states’ income tax definitions of residence and at the Code’s similar,
two-definition approach to the tax status of aliens, it is unlikely that Con-
gress would make the substantial presence test (or any similar mechanical
test of physical presence in the United States) the sole criterion for impos-
ing worldwide income taxation. Rather, the states’ experience and the cur-
rent version of § 7701(b)(1)(A) pertaining to aliens suggest that Congress
would augment any mechanical test of physical residence with a parallel
test of domicile, or something like domicile.
For a U.S. citizen, the analogue to an alien’s immigration law status as
a permanent resident is the citizen’s citizenship. Thus, by this thought
game, we wind up with the status quo. As the states’ experience demon-
strates, domicile as a factually unwieldy definition of residence for income
tax purposes is manipulable by the taxpayer and is difficult for the states
to enforce. Domicile is nevertheless a useful, gap-filling approach to resi-
dence for income tax purposes since mechanical tests of residence can also
be manipulated and can be under-inclusive. Citizenship (like permanent
resident status) is an efficient proxy for domicile. Thus, the states’ experi-
ence buttresses the United States’ citizenship-based approach to income
taxation. Citizenship is an efficient, administrable proxy for domicile.
Just as statutory residence laws can be under-inclusive, citizenship can
be over-inclusive as a proxy for domicile. However, U.S. citizenship-based
income taxation is abated through many devices such as credits for foreign
58. I.R.C. § 7701(b)(1)(A)(i) (2015).
59. I.R.C. § 7701(b)(1)(A)(i) (2015).
284 Michigan Journal of International Law [Vol. 38:271
income taxes,60 the generous exclusion from gross income for foreign
earned income and for housing allowances,61 and treaty provisions to
avoid double taxation.62 In light of these devices, U.S. citizenship serves
the same gap-filling function as does state domiciliary status, taxing the
relatively affluent U.S. citizen when he does not pay income tax to the
nation in which he currently resides.
I thus confess that, just as I am unimpressed by stories about Boris
Johnson or by complaints that U.S. citizenship-based taxation is sui
generis, the self-serving pleadings of U.S. citizens living abroad leave me
unconvinced. If a U.S. citizen makes less than the amount of income ex-
cluded by § 911 or pays creditable income taxes to his country of residence
at a rate equal to or exceeding his U.S. tax rate, this citizen pays no income
tax to the United States. U.S. citizenship-based taxation is gap-filling, re-
quiring U.S. income tax payments only when a relatively well-paid U.S.
citizen pays no tax where he lives.
The most compelling example of over-inclusiveness is the so-called
“accidental” U.S. citizen who does not know and cannot realistically be
expected to know that she is a U.S. citizen, subject to worldwide income
taxation. The Internal Revenue Code already contains provisions which
facilitate the renunciation of U.S. citizenship by such accidental citizens.63
It is possible that these provisions should be expanded further.
On balance, however, citizenship is an administrable proxy for domi-
cile and serves the same gap-filling function as does domicile in the states’
income tax systems. Other nations’ residence-based income tax systems
confront factually unwieldy determinations of residence similar to the
messy, fact-intensive tax controversies routinely decided by the U.S. state
courts on the subject of domicile.64 The U.S. system of citizenship-based
taxation eliminates these sprawling controversies, replacing the factually
subjective domicile inquiry with the bright line rule of citizenship.
Moreover, among those who advance a benefits theory of citizenship
taxation,65 the right to return to the United States is frequently cited as
the most important benefit of a U.S. passport. This argument suggests that
U.S. citizens who reside abroad for extended stays view the United States
as a permanent location to which they will some day return. The right of
return indicates permanent allegiance. Hence, U.S. citizenship again
proves to be a reasonable proxy for U.S. domicile.
60. I.R.C. § 901 (2015).
61. I.R.C. § 911 (2015).
62. See, e.g., U.S. TREASURY, UNITED STATES MODEL INCOME TAX CONVENTION OF
NOVEMBER 15, 2006, art. 4(3) (containing provisions to assign a single state of residence to
dual residents); Convention for the Avoidance of Double Taxation and the Prevention of
Fiscal Evasion with Respect to Taxes on Income and on Capital Gains art. 24, U.S.-U.K., July
24, 2001, S. TREATY DOC. No. 107-19 (2002).
63. I.R.C. § 877(c) (2015) (special relief for certain dual citizens and minors).
64. Zelinsky, Citizenship and Worldwide Taxation, supra note 6, at 1324-42.
65. Id. at 1345.
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CONCLUSION
The states’ difficulties enforcing domicile-based taxation highlight the
administrative benefits of citizenship-based taxation. As long as residence
is understood for tax purposes in terms of domicile, citizenship is an effi-
cient proxy for such domicile. The states’ experience defining residence
supports the United States’ citizenship-based approach to federal income
taxation. Under the Internal Revenue Code, citizenship is an adminis-
trable proxy for domicile and serves the same gap-filling function played
by domicile under the states’ income taxes.
